Meditations
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the Stoic said that there could be no gradations between virtue
and vice, though of course each has its special manifestations.
Moreover, nothing is good but virtue, and nothing but vice is bad.
Those outside things which are commonly called good or bad,
such as health and sickness, wealth and poverty, pleasure and pain,
are to him indifferent adiofora. All these things are merely
the sphere in which virtue may act. The ideal Wise Man is
sufficient unto himself in all things, autarkhs and knowing
these truths, he will be happy even when stretched upon the rack.
It is probable that no Stoic claimed for himself that he was
this Wise Man, but that each strove after it as an ideal
much as the Christian strives after a likeness to Christ.
The exaggeration in this statement was, however, so obvious,
that the later Stoics were driven to make a further subdivision
of things indifferent into what is preferable (prohgmena) and what
is undesirable. They also held that for him who had not
attained to the perfect wisdom, certain actions were proper.
(kaqhkonta) These were neither virtuous nor vicious,
but, like the indifferent things, held a middle place.
Two points in the Stoic system deserve special mention.
One is a careful distinction between things which are in
our power and things which are not. Desire and dislike,
opinion and affection, are within the power of the will;
whereas health, wealth, honour, and other such are general1y not so.
The Stoic was called upon to control his desires and affections,
and to guide his opinion; to bring his whole being under the sway
of the will or leading principle, just as the universe is
guided and governed by divine Providence. This is a special
application of the favourite Greek virtue of moderation,
(swfrosuum) and has also its parallel in Christian ethics.
The second point is a strong insistence on the unity of
the universe, and on man's duty as part of a great whole.
Public spirit was the most splendid political virtue
of the ancient world, and it is here made cosmopolitan.
It is again instructive to note that Christian sages insisted
on the same thing. Christians are taught that they are
members of a worldwide brotherhood, where is neither Greek
nor Hebrew, bond nor free and that they live their lives
as fellow-workers with God.
Such is the system which underlies the meditations of Marcus Aurelius.
Some knowledge of it is necessary to the right understanding
of the book, but for us the chief interest lies elsewhere.
We do not come to Marcus Aurelius for a treatise on Stoicism.
He is no head of a school to lay down a body of doctrine for students;
he does not even contemplate that others should read what he writes.
His philosophy is not an eager intellectual inquiry, but more
what we should call religious feeling. The uncompromising
stiffness of Zeno or Chrysippus is softened and transformed
by passing through a nature reverent and tolerant, gentle and
free from guile; the grim resignation which made life possible
to the Stoic sage becomes in him almost a mood of aspiration.
His book records the innermost thoughts of his heart, set down
to ease it, with such moral maxims and reflections as may help
him to bear the burden of duty and the countless annoyances
of a busy life.
It is instructive to compare the meditations with another
famous book, the Imitation of Christ. There is the same
ideal of self-control in both. It should be a man's task,
says the Imitation, 'to overcome himself, and every day to be
stronger than himself.' 'In withstanding of the passions
standeth very peace of heart.' 'Let us set the axe to the root,
that we being purged of our passions may have a peaceable mind.'
To this end there must be continual self-examination. 'If thou
may not continually gather thyself together, namely sometimes
do it, at least once a day, the morning or the evening.
In the morning purpose, in the evening discuss the manner,
what thou hast been this day, in word, work, and thought.'
But while the Roman's temper is a modest self-reliance,
the Christian aims at a more passive mood, humbleness and meekness,
and reliance on the presence and personal friendship of God.
The Roman scrutinises his faults with severity, but without
the self-contempt which makes the Christian 'vile in his own sight.'
The Christian, like the Roman, bids 'study to withdraw thine
heart from the love of things visible'; but it is not the busy
life of duty he has in mind so much as the contempt of all
worldly things, and the 'cutting away of all lower delectations.'
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